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THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON COVERT SURVEILLANCE:
LEGALITY UNDERCOVER?
With a month into his two-year term, Chief Executive Donald Tsang issued an
executive order governing covert surveillance by law enforcement.' This was
only the second time an original executive order had been issued pursuant to
Article 48(4) of the Basic Law.2 The Order touched upon matters of significant
public concern and brought a storm of questions and criticisms at the start of
Hong Kong's rainy typhoon season.
The Provisions of the Order
The Order laid down a procedural scheme for law enforcement agents to
obtain authorisations for covert surveillance from senior authorising officers,
designated as such by their department heads. Covert surveillance is defined
as having four ingredients: (i) systematic surveillance of any person for the
purposes of a specific law enforcement investigation or operation; (ii) the
surveillance is carried out in circumstances where the person is entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy; (iii) the surveillance is carried out in a
manner calculated to ensure that the person is unaware that the surveillance
is or may be taking place; and (iv) the surveillance is likely to result in the
obtaining of any private information about the person. Before issuing the
authorisation, the authorising officer must be satisfied on the written infor-
mation provided that the covert surveillance furthers a specified purpose
(ie preventing or detecting crime, or protecting public safety or security) and
is proportionate to the purpose sought to be furthered, having balanced the
operational need for the covert surveillance against its intrusiveness and
considered whether the purposes could be furthered by less intrusive means.
According to official statements, the Order was intended not to confer new
investigative powers but merely to codify and provide uniformity to the
existing practices of the various law enforcement agencies.'
I Executive Order No 1 of 2005 gazetted as Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures) Order,
Special Supplement No 5 to Hong Kong Government Gazette No 31/2005, E57-E75 [hereinafter
referred to as "the Order"].
2 Art 48(4) provides that the Chief Executive shall have the power and function to "decide on govern-
ment policies and to issue executive orders".
See "CE speaks on Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures) Order", Hong Kong Govern-
ment Press Release, 6 Aug 2005 [hereinafter referred to as "CE's Remarks No 1"]; "Transcript of Chief
Executive's media stand-up session", Hong Kong Government Press Release, 11 Aug 2005 [hereinafter
referred to as "CE's Remarks No 2"].
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Section 4 provided that the Order did not apply to covert surveillance
authorised under any law, such as section 33 of the Telecommunications
Ordinance (Cap 106), which confers an unfettered power on the Chief
Executive to authorise interception of private telecommunications in the
public interest.' Notwithstanding section 4, the Order still applied to a wide
range of electronic and non-electronic forms of surveillance, such as bugging,
hidden cameras, undercover operations, stake-outs, computer spyware, track-
ing devices, global positioning system devices, etc.
The Order is also noteworthy for what it did not provide. The information
upon which the authorisations are granted need not to be presented under
oath or affirmation, which is the usual requirement for search warrants.
Although officers are expressly prohibited from conducting covert surveil-
lance without proper authorisation, the consequences for failing to comply
with the Order are not spelled out. No stipulations are imposed on the use or
destruction of the evidence gathered by covert surveillance. No special safe-
guards are provided for the surveillance of confidential communication
between persons having a special trust relationship such as those between
lawyer and client, journalist and source, priest and penitent, doctor and patient,
etc. The process involves no judicial oversight whatsoever, although it is
doubtful, as acknowledged by the government, that such an oversight mecha-
nism could be prescribed in an executive Order.' The Order only provides for
periodic review by superior officers and internal guidelines specific to the law
enforcement agency. Simply stated, the Order left the police to police
themselves.
The Legality and Legal Effect of the Order
The most interesting legal issues surrounding the Order concern its legality
and legal effect. These two issues cannot be addressed in isolation for one
must know the Order's legal effect to assess its lawfulness. Legality concerns
whether it was lawful for the Chief Executive to issue the Order. This in turn
requires an examination of the scope of the Chief Executive's power under
Article 48(4) of the Basic Law to make executive orders, and more generally
4 The constitutionality of this provision has been called into question, see Ng Hon Wah, "Remedies
Against Telephone Tapping by the Government" (2003) 33 HKLJ 543; Philip Dykes, "Must Private
Respects Always Yield to the Public Good?", paper for the Archbold Hong Kong Criminal Law
Conference 2004, 13 Nov 2004.
5 See Statement of Ian Wingfield, Law Officer, Department of Justice, "The Regulation of Covert
Surveillance", 10 Aug 2005, para 16, which can be found on the website of the Hong Kong Depart-
ment of Justice, www.doj.gov.hk [hereinafter referred to as the "Wingfield Statement"].
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the question of how powers are divided and separated between the executive
and legislative branches of government under the Basic Law.
Official statements on the legal effect of the Order confirmed a narrow
understanding of the Chief Executive's power to make executive orders. It
was said that the Order "is not law", that it "cannot create criminal offences,
amend legislation, or impose obligations on members of the public", that "the
Chief Executive has no power to regulate members of the community by way
of an Executive Order", that executive orders cannot "give powers to, or
impose functions on, members of the independent Judiciary", that the Order
"does not affect the rights and privileges of private citizens" and "only regu-
lates the behaviour of public servants".' From these statements, the government
appeared to accept the position that executive orders are only administrative
measures binding on public servants when acting in their capacity as such.
This narrow interpretation of the Chief Executive's power is welcome for a
number of reasons.
First, the interpretation respects the language of Article 48(4) because
the power to "issue executive orders" is joined with and follows the authority
to "decide on government policies". The Chief Executive does not have a
free-standing power to promulgate laws but only a limited power to mobilise
the executive authorities for the purpose of implementing government policies.
Secondly, the interpretation respects the strong separation of powers pro-
vided for in the Basic Law.' As only the Legislative Council has been given
the power and function to enact, amend and repeal laws, any law-making
powers conferred on the executive must be narrowly construed.' Thirdly the
interpretation is consistent with the exercise of the power on the first and
only other occasion. The Public Service (Administration) Order 1997 was
issued on 9 July 1997 to fill the void left after the lapse of the Letters Patent
and Colonial Regulations on 1 July 1997.1 This executive order provided for
the appointment, dismissal, suspension and discipline of public servants. With
the exception of one provision, the 1997 Order survived a constitutional
challenge in the Court of First Instance."o
6 See Wingfield Statement, ibid., paras 11, 14 & 16; CE's Remarks No 1 (n 3 above).
7 See Peter Wesley-Smith, "Executive Orders and the Basic Law", in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for
Practitioners 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law Journal Ltd, 1998) 187-191.
8 See Art 73 of the Basic Law for the powers and functions of the Legislative Council.
9 Executive Order No 1 of 1997, cited as Public Service (Administration) Order, Special Supplement
No 5 toHong Kong Government Gazette No 2/1997, E5-E19 [hereinafter referred to as "the 1997
Order"].
10 See The Association of Expatriate Civil Servants of Hong Kong v The Chief Executive of the HKSAR
[1998] 1 HKLRD 615 (CFl).
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The Contradiction
Having said that the Order was not law capable of imposing obligations on
members of the public, the government appeared to contradict itself when it
came to the legal effect of the order on protected rights and freedoms, par-
ticularly those in Article 30 of the Basic Law, which provides as follows:
"The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents shall
be protected by law. No department or individual may, on any grounds,
infringe upon the freedom and privacy of communication of residents
except that the relevant authorities may inspect communication in accor-
dance with legal procedures to meet the needs of public security or of
investigation into criminal offences." [Emphasis added.]
In the same official statements, it was said that the Order provided
the "necessary legal procedures" for restricting rights under Article 30." The
implication was that covert surveillance done pursuant to the order would
survive constitutional scrutiny. This is a classic example of wanting to suck
and blow at the same time. The government would like to have it both ways:
on the one hand, to allay the public concern by minimising the legal effect of
the Order but, on the other, to claim it is of sufficient legality to overcome
constitutional challenge.
In defending its position, the government relied on the decision of Justice
Keith in the constitutional challenge to the 1997 Order. It was argued in this
case that the dismissal of a public servant could only be pursuant to Article
48(7) of the Basic Law which provided for the Chief Executive's power to
remove holders of public office "in accordance with legal procedures". Since
the 1997 Order was not "legal procedures", as it was argued, dismissal taken
under the order would not be in compliance with Article 48(7). Justice Keith
rejected this argument. He held that the 1997 Order could be "legal proce-
dures" for the purposes of Article 48(7).x" However, Justice Keith reached his
decision by construing Article 48(7) in light of Article 103 which provided
that Hong Kong's previous system of employment and discipline of public
servants was to be maintained." Since the previous system was based on the
Letters Patent and Colonial Regulations, instruments flowing from the Crown
prerogative, allowing an executive order to take the place of these instru-
ments was consistent with Article 103.
11 Wingfield Statement (n 6 above), para 6.
12 The Association of Expatriate Cvil Servants of Hong Kong (n 10 above), para 14.
13 Ibid.
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While the 1997 Order constituted "legal procedures" for the purposes of
Article 48(7), this does not answer the question of whether the 2005 Order
is capable of being "legal procedures" for the purposes of Article 30. This is
because Article 30, unlike Article 48, confers a fundamental human right
which all persons in Hong Kong enjoy. Article 48(7) is a provision that
confers powers and functions on the Chief Executive in respect of public
servants. Since executive orders are only binding on public servants, it is
understandable that they can constitute "legal procedures" for the purposes
of Article 48(7). But for executive orders to constitute "legal procedures"
under Article 30, it would mean that they were capable of binding all
persons in Hong Kong, a position which even by the government's account
is untenable given the restricted authority to issue executive orders.
The Legal Effect on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Another fundamental flaw in the government's argument lies in its position
that Article 30 confers a power on law enforcement to conduct covert sur-
veillance and the Order serves to limit the exercise of this power. While
Article 48(7) may confer a power, Article 30 does no such thing. The posi-
tion has confused a test for restriction with a law prescribing a restriction.
The second part of Article 30 contains a test for restriction and is not a law
prescribing a restriction. It is highly doubtful that the Basic Law would confer
a fundamental human right in one breath and then undermine it in the same
breath by providing the prescription for its restriction. It is for this reason
that there exists the overriding rule in Article 39 of the Basic Law that the
"rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted
unless as prescribed by law." The clear intention in Article 39 is that the
"prescribed by law" requirement applies to all protected rights and freedoms.
Article 30 merely fleshes out additional requirements which must be met
before a prescribed law can justifiably restrict the freedom and right in
Article 30. The "prescribed by law" requirement is of fundamental impor-
tance because it reinforces the rule of law and requires that restrictions not
only be lawful but have some basis in the positive law that is sufficiently
certain. Thus, it is likely that "legal procedures" in Article 30 shares the same
meaning as "prescribed by law" in Article 39. " It follows from this argument
that even with the Order there exists no prescribed law that empowers law
enforcement to carry out covert surveillance.
14 In an analogous manner, the Court of Final Appeal in Leung Kwok Hung & Others v HKSAR [2005]
HKEC 1035 interpreted the expression "in conformity with the law", which qualified the right to
peaceful assembly in Article 17 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, as having the same meaning as
"prescribed by law" in Art 39 of the Basic Law.
Vol 35 Part 2
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There are other reasons to doubt the ability of the Order to immunise
covert surveillance from a successful constitutional challenge. There has yet
to be close judicial consideration of Article 30. The first part of the article
provides for the freedom in a special manner because it does not stop at the
mere statement of the freedom but also provides that the freedom and right
"shall be protected by law". This formulation suggests a positive obligation
on the state to have in place adequate laws that allow individuals to enjoy the
freedom and privacy of communication. Not only must there be criminal
laws that prohibit interference with these rights and interests but also laws
that facilitate and enhance the enjoyment of the right and freedom. It also
implies, and this becomes clearer in the second part of Article 30, that the
article covers infringements by both governmental authority and private
persons. In other words, Article 30 was intended to have horizontal effect.
As discussed above the second part of Article 30 provides the pre-requisite
conditions which the government must satisfy before the prescribed law can
be used to restrict justifiably the freedom and right in Article 30. This express
qualification is rare for the rights and freedoms contained in Chapter III of
the Basic Law, although fairly common for those in the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights. This however does not diminish the status of the protected freedom
for the Court of Final Appeal has adopted restriction tests to Basic Law rights
expressed in unqualified language." The scope of restriction provided is quite
narrow as it only allows governmental authorities to "inspect communication
in accordance with legal procedures" for the purposes of either public security
or investigation into criminal offences.
One should pause to ponder the choice of the word "inspect" rather than
"infringe", which is the word used in the first clause of the second sentence.
Notice as well that the words, "restrict", "limit", "intercept", "record", or
"monitor" were not used. It is arguable that the phrase "inspect communica-
tion" when construed narrowly in light of its ordinary meaning contemplates
at least one of the persons involved in the communication having knowledge
of the inspection when it is carried out. Indeed it is difficult to think of a
situation where government officials would normally carry out a lawful
inspection, whether of premises, facilities, property, documents, or a person's
body, without the knowledge of someone who is affected by the inspection.
One sees that the rights in Article 30 are provided in a robust manner and
the scope for permissible restrictions is narrow. Thus it is highly doubtful that
the Order with its minimal safeguards and lack of judicial oversight would
meet the necessity and proportionality requirements for justifying restrictions.
15 For example, in Leung Kwok Hung, ibid., paras 17-21, the Court applied the express limitations clause
in Article 17 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights to the unqualified "freedom of assembly" provided for
in Article 27 of the Basic Law.
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The determination of these issues would also be affected by the intended use
of the information obtained by covert surveillance. Currently, however, there
are no legal prohibitions on using such information as incriminating evidence
at trial.
The Political Consequences
The decision to make the Order was a bold one for Tsang acted without con-
sulting the public, the legislature and even his own executive council advisors.
It was reported that the Executive Council was not consulted because the
Order did not involve a change in policy and was not subsidiary legislation. 16
But the failure to consult proved to be a grave political mistake as the Order
drew immediate and sharp criticism from legislators, the Bar Association, the
Law Society, academics and others.
The decision was also bold because the Order purported to legitimise
covert investigative practices which were the subject of criticism in two
recent District Court cases." The Order was an inadequate response to these
criticisms. In the first case, the Independent Commission Against Corrup-
tion (ICAC) installed a bugging device in a VIP room of a Tsim Sha Tsui
hotel restaurant. " A film recording of who entered and left the VIP room
during a two and half hour period was also made. Surveillance was done at a
second restaurant using a hidden video camera recording a meeting and con-
versation at a nearby table. By using these covert tactics, the ICAC was able
to obtain incriminating admissions and other evidence which they sought to
adduce in the bribery prosecution. At issue was whether these recordings could
be admitted as evidence. The defence argued that the covert surveillance
infringed the defendant's rights under Article 30 of the Basic Law.
Judge Sweeney accepted this defence submission and found that "the
system of covertly intercepting private communication, as practiced by the
ICAC" in this case "was not 'in accordance with legal procedures"'.' 9 He held
that "both sets of recordings were made in breach of Article 30 of the Basic
Law and so were unlawfully made".20 For years, the ICAC have used a system
16 See Jimmy Cheung, "Bugging order 'does not need Exco nod"', South China Morning Post, 15 Aug
2005. Article 56 of the Basic Law provides inter alia the following: "Except for the appointment,
removal and disciplining of officials and the adoption of measures in emergencies, the Chief Execu-
tive shall consult the Executive Council before making important policy decisions, introducing bills
to the Legislative Council, making subordinate legislation, or dissolving the Legislative Council."
17 HKSAR v Li Man-tak & Others [2005] HKEC 1308, DC; HKSAR v Shum Chiu & Others, unreported
ruling on permanent stay of proceedings, DCCC 687/2004, 5 July 2005, Deputy Judge Livesey.
18 HKSAR v Li Man-tak, ibid.
19 Ibid., para 55.
20 Ibid.
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of internal authorisation pursuant to "Standing Orders" which have no legis-
lative basis. In coming to his decision, Judge Sweeney reviewed authorities
from England and the European Court of Human Rights which emphasised
the essential requirement of having a "statutory system to regulate the use of
covert listening devices" if the practices were to be "in accordance with the
law".2' As there was no "legislative framework in Hong Kong to regulate
covert surveillance", Judge Sweeney found that "the minimum degree of legal
protection to which citizens of Hong Kong are entitled under Article 30 of
the Basic Law is lacking, i.e. there is a legislative lacuna".22 Ultimately Judge
Sweeney admitted the recordings as evidence in the trial but he warned the
authorities at the end of his ruling that that in future cases evidence obtained
by covert surveillance might be inadmissible "if they continue this practice
without some legislative basis". [Emphasis added.]2" Throughout the judgment
his Honour consistently contemplated that nothing short of legislation could
pass constitutional scrutiny under Article 30.
In the second District Court case, the ICAC were investigating a number
of employees in ABB company for conspiring to offer advantages to a public
officer.24 Early in the investigation, a subordinate in the company, who was
also being investigated at the time, became an undercover agent for the ICAC.
Over a period of more than one year, the agent periodically furnished the
ICAC with company documents and tapes of covertly recorded conversations.
About six months into his work as an undercover agent, the agent informed
the ICAC of a forthcoming lunch meeting between the third defendant (D3)
and a solicitor. The meeting was to take place only nine days after the ICAC
had raided the company with search warrants and arrested employees but not
D3 who was outside of Hong Kong at the time. On hearing of the meeting,
the ICAC arranged to equip the agent with a covert recording device so that
the meeting could be recorded. The agent secretly recorded the hour-long
meeting attended by D3, the agent, and two solicitors from a prominent law
firm specialising in criminal law, who provided legal advice during the meeting.
The ICAC did not intend to use the tape recording as evidence, and at the
trial, neither the prosecution nor defence had listened to the tape recording.
21 Ibid., para 51, citing from Khan v United Kingdom [2001131 EHRR 45 (EurCrtHR). Art 8(2) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides that
there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence "except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
22 Ibid., para 54.
23 Ibid., para 67.
24 HKSAR % Shum Chiu (n 17 above), para 8.
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At the outset of the trial, the defence (D3 and three other defendants)
brought applications to have the prosecution stayed on the grounds of an
abuse of process. Deputy Judge Livesey granted the stays but for different
reasons in respect of the two groups of defendants. In respect of D3's
application, the judge found that the ICAC "deliberately and intentionally"
recorded a conversation between D3 and his solicitors knowing that legal
advice protected by legal professional privilege "would almost certainly be
given"." She found a "serious flaw" with the internal authorisation process as
there was non-disclosure of the likelihood that solicitors would be present at
the meeting. 6 She also found that it was unnecessary to carry out the covert
recording as the ICAC already had enough evidence to charge D3.n1 She
described the ICAC conduct as "a cynical and flagrant infringement of D3's
right to legal professional privilege" and stayed the prosecution against him
on the basis that it was "an affront to the public conscience with severe
consequences for public confidence in the administration of justice."" As for
the other defendants, Deputy Judge Livesey found that it was impossible for
them to have a fair trial since they were barred from accessing the taped
privileged conversation for the essential purpose of cross-examining the
undercover agent at trial.29
There is nothing in the Order that prevents the ICAC from repeating the
same conduct seen in these two cases. Failing to heed Judge Sweeney's
closing admonition, the evidence in the first case would now more likely
than not be excluded resulting in the possible acquittal of the defendants.
From the perspective of political legitimacy, it seems difficult to justify in the
face of these two strongly worded judicial rulings the issuance of an executive
order that gives law enforcement false confidence in the constitutional firmity
of their actions.
The Interim Period: Implications for Admissibility
When the Order was issued, the government stated that it was only to be an
interim measure until legislation could be passed. It has been argued in this
comment that the Order is hardly a measure since it lacks the legality to alter
the current unconstitutional character of covert surveillance. But constitu-
tionally invalid executive action does not necessarily result in an acquittal, a
stay of proceedings or the exclusion of evidence. Unfortunately, this issue of
25 Ibid., para 13.
26 Ibid., para 20.
27 lbid., para 22.
28 Ibid., paras 33 & 36.
29 Ibid., paras 45-51.
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constitutional remedy is one that is severely underdeveloped in Hong Kong's
jurisprudence.
In the first District Court case, Judge Sweeney found a breach of Article
30 but still admitted the evidence in the trial and later convicted the
defendants.30 Judge Sweeney felt constrained to apply R v Cheung Ka Fai, an
early Hong Kong Bill of Rights decision which held that the jurisdiction of
the judge to exclude evidence for breaches of the Bill of Rights was no greater
than that under the common law." The common law has historically been
shackled by the orthodox position expressed with great force and clarity in
R v Sang that the court is generally not concerned with how evidence is
obtained. 2 Unable to find that the admission of the recordings would affect
the fairness of the trial and finding that the ICAC had made a bona fide
mistake as to their powers, Judge Sweeney admitted the evidence.
The reliance on Cheung Ka Fai is somewhat problematic because this
authority turned on the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the remedial pro-
vision in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), a provision
which has no obvious application to Basic Law rights. Judge Sweeney was
presented with a difficult question of first impression: what test for exclusion
is to be applied for evidence obtained in breach of a Basic Law right when the
Basic Law itself has no remedial provision? There were only two possible
answers. Either the Basic Law conferred a unique jurisdiction to exclude evi-
dence or it conferred nothing, in which case, the common law continued to
apply. If the answer was the former then it was open to the court to devise a
new test for exclusion that was sufficiently strict to befit a constitutional
instrument. If the answer was the latter, there was still the further question of
whether the common law had evolved since Sang to recognise a wider basis
for excluding improperly obtained evidence. In this respect, pre-existing
common law principles, such as the principle of integrity evident in both the
doctrine of abuse of process and the law of confessions, could ground a new
basis for excluding evidence obtained as a result of a serious breach of the
defendant's constitutional right by state agents acting with little if any good
faith."
30 Jonathan Li, "Executives jailed for their role in stock share scam", South China Morning Post, 26 June
2005, 2.
31 Rv Cheung Ka Fai (1995) 5 HKPLR 407 (CA).
32 R v Sang [1980] AC 402 (HL).
33 s 6(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383) provides that the court "may grant such
remedy or relief, or make such order, in respect of such a breach, violation or threatened violation as
it has power to grant or make in those proceedings and as it considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances". [Emphasis added]
" See Chapter 6 of Simon N.M. Young, Hong Kong Evidence Casebook (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell
Asia, 2004) 551-639 for a development of this position by reference to relevant authorities.
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The Future
In the debate to enact legislation on covert surveillance discussions will likely
focus on two contrasting models of implementation. The first model, which
could be described as the "intelligence-gathering model", imposes minimal
hurdles on law enforcement at the authorisation stage. This results in a high
volume of information gathered by covert surveillance, but law enforcement
takes added precautions to protect the privacy of this information including
the timely destruction of the recorded information. The information is treated
as "intelligence" rather than as evidence in trial proceedings. The intercepted
communication is kept private from the public but not from law enforcement.
The second model envisages the process as a means of gathering fruitful
evidence to be admitted at trial. Thus this "evidence-gathering model" pro-
vides greater safeguards at the authorisation stage, which most likely will
involve judicial authorisation. Law enforcement must also act responsibly
when carrying out the surveillance since improper or unreasonable behaviour
may jeopardise the admissibility of the evidence. The consequence is a smaller
volume of information gathered but the advantage gained is that this infor-
mation can be used as evidence and in most cases, it will be very strong
evidence for the prosecution. But the open court principle and disclosure to
the defence will mean that the evidence will be made public.
While it is true that the two models are not mutually exclusive, the sec-
ond model offers a higher degree of protection for fundamental rights and
freedoms. One should not be misled by the privacy assurances of the intelli-
gence-gathering model. Privacy interests are compromised from the moment
the covert surveillance begins. The first model is already being practiced by
law enforcement in Hong Kong with authorisations granted under section 33
of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106). Unfortunately this
experience has been marked by an aura of secrecy and overly broad claims of
public interest immunity. The total lack of transparency has bred public cyni-
cism in both the law enforcement agency and the government. The assurance
that the intelligence gathered will not be used as evidence is also misleading
because such intelligence can often lead to the finding of admissible evidence
which would not otherwise have been found. Use of this derivative evidence
allows law enforcement to realise the fruits of the evidence-gathering model
without having to surpass the due process hurdles of that model. The policy
to destroy surveillance information helps law enforcement to obfuscate the
degree to which their evidence gathering has been aided by the intelligence
obtained.
3 The practices of the ICAC are described in HKSAR v Mo Yuk Ping & Others [2005] HKEC 1318, DC,
paras 10-22.
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These considerations and others will no doubt be hotly debated in the
Legislative Council after the tabling of proposed legislation. While it is near
impossible to predict the outcome of these debates, one thing is clear: the
Order will be largely irrelevant to these debates and in the meantime will
have served more to cause unnecessary public concern and legal uncertainty
than to clarify the law.
Simon N.M. Young*
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